@article {12851,
	title = {K ot{\'a}zke kolekt{\'\i}vnej mor{\'a}lnej zodpovednosti ne{\v s}trukt{\'u}rovan{\'y}ch zoskupen{\'\i}},
	journal = {Filozofia},
	volume = {74},
	number = {8},
	year = {2019},
	pages = {608-621},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {The hypothesis of the article is the idea that the collective moral responsibility is meaningful also at the level of unstructured groups, which do not have a stable identity capable of persisting over time. According to the author, such a grouping does not necessarily have to fulfill the conditions specific to a structured group in order to have the status of an agent and be able to bear moral responsibility (for example to avert evil in situations requiring collective action); nor does it need to possess the qualities that are usually a prerequisite to classify an agent as responsible for its actions - such as autonomy of will, cognitive ability, intention, and control over its actions. Regarding the question of collective moral responsibility for the consequences of a collective action (or collective inactivity), the author suggests: a) to use Ric{\oe}ur{\textquoteright}s concept of responsibility in its specific moral dimen- sion involving the relationship with others; b) to modify the archaic {\textquotedblleft}all for oneˮ principle so that, instead of solidarity with the transgressor, it implies solidarity with those in distress or with those who are experiencing injustice.},
	keywords = {H. Arendt, imput{\'a}cia, kolekt{\'\i}vna zodpovednos{\v t}, n{\'a}hodn{\'e} zoskupenie, P. Ric{\oe}ur, zodpovednos{\v t}},
	url = {https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/10252140filozofia.2019.74.8.2.pdf},
	author = {Smrekov{\'a}, Dagmar}
}
