@article {13123,
	title = {Troj{\'\i} pojet{\'\i} svobody},
	journal = {Filozofia},
	volume = {76},
	number = {2},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {110 {\textendash} 124},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {Berlin{\textquoteright}s division of liberty into its positive and negative variants is usually men-tioned as a point of reference in the debates about freedom. However, I consider as more fundamental the difference between liberal freedom and freedom based on responsible relations with other people and the surrounding world. In other words, I question the meaning of freedom, which - with a reference to the conception of Ladislav Hejd{\'a}nek, proponent of the Czech practical philosophy {\textendash} I do not consider to be an elimination of various life bonds, but instead their acceptance, fulfilment, or improvement. However, such binding freedom can also find its {\textquotedblleft}allies{\textquotedblright} in liberalism {\textendash} namely in the so-called liberalism of fear (B. Williams, J. Shklar), which is surprisingly close to Hejd{\'a}nek{\textquoteright}s conception and represents at least one of the contemporary currents of liberalism, able to unite with a seemingly opposing tradition. In addition to introducing Hejd{\'a}nek{\textquoteright}s conception of freedom, the aim of the paper is also to outline this connection.},
	keywords = {Freedom, Ladislav Hejd{\'a}nek, Liberalism of fear},
	url = {https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/02261311filozofia.2020.76.2.3.pdf},
	author = {Hejduk, Tom{\'a}{\v s}}
}
