@article {13968,
	title = {The Human Being as {\textquoteleft}Compound{\textquoteright}: Aquinas versus Descartes on Human Nature},
	journal = {Filozofia},
	volume = {79},
	number = {9},
	year = {2024},
	pages = {955 - 969},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {The intuitively right answer to the question {\textquoteleft}What am I?{\textquoteright} is not {\textquoteleft}an incorporeal spirit{\textquoteright}, but {\textquoteleft}a human being{\textquoteright}. Aquinas reflects this common-sense view when he says that {\textquoteleft}the human is no mere soul, but a compound of soul and body.{\textquoteright} And Descartes, despite his notorious dualistic thesis that I am a substance that does not need anything material in order to exist, insists nevertheless that the human mind-body compound is a genuine unity in its own right, not a mere soul making using of a body. This paper argues for the enduring philosophical importance of this notion of our {\textquoteleft}compound{\textquoteright} nature as human beings, and explores its significance across three principal dimensions {\textendash} the psychological, the phenomenological, and the moral.},
	doi = {https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.9.1},
	url = {https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/1115111310.31577filozofia.2024.79.9.1.pdf},
	author = {Cottingham, John}
}
