<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Smreková, Dagmar</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">K otázke kolektívnej morálnej zodpovednosti neštruktúrovaných zoskupení</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Filozofia</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On the Problem of Collective Moral Responsibility of Unstructured Groups</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">H. Arendt</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">imputácia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">kolektívna zodpovednosť</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">náhodné zoskupenie</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">P. Ricœur</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">zodpovednosť</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2019</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/10252140filozofia.2019.74.8.2.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">8</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">74</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">608-621</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Slovak</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The hypothesis of the article is the idea that the collective moral responsibility is meaningful also at the level of unstructured groups, which do not have a stable identity capable of persisting over time. According to the author, such a grouping does not necessarily have to fulfill the conditions specific to a structured group in order to have the status of an agent and be able to bear moral responsibility (for example to avert evil in situations requiring collective action); nor does it need to possess the qualities that are usually a prerequisite to classify an agent as responsible for its actions - such as autonomy of will, cognitive ability, intention, and control over its actions. Regarding the question of collective moral responsibility for the consequences of a collective action (or collective inactivity), the author suggests: a) to use Ricœur's concept of responsibility in its specific moral dimen- sion involving the relationship with others; b) to modify the archaic “all for oneˮ principle so that, instead of solidarity with the transgressor, it implies solidarity with those in distress or with those who are experiencing injustice.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articles</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">608621</style></custom3></record></records></xml>