<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wollner, Ulrich</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chápe Nussbaumová spôsobilosti ako slobody?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Filozofia</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Does Nussbaum Understand Capabilities as Freedoms?</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Capability approach</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Central capabilities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Isaiah Berlin</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Martha C. Nussbaum</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Political freedom</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/02261334filozofia.2020.76.2.2.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">76</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">97 – 109</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The aim of the article is to analyse and interpret the conceptualization of Nussbaum’s capabilities as freedoms. In the first part, we will focus on the main characteristics of the capability approach, of which Martha C. Nussbaum, together with Amartya Sen, is the main exponent. In the next section, we focus on the questions: Is it appropriate to apply Berlin’s distinction typology between “negative liberty” and “positive liberty” to Nussbaum’s understanding of capabilities? Is it adequate to equate her understanding of competences with “positive liberty”? Is it appropriate to use the terminology of freedom for the objectives that the capability-based approach seeks to achieve?</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articles</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">97109</style></custom3></record></records></xml>