Article/Publication Details

Is Conceptual Relativism a Prerequisite for Philosophy as Conceptual Engineering?

(Original title: Je pojmový relativizmus predpokladom filozofie ako pojmového inžinierstva?)
Filozofia, 2021, vol. 76, No 1, pp. 3 – 17.
File to download: PDF*
BibTex EndNote Tagged EndNote XML RIS

Document Statistics:

Number of visits: 772
Number of visits today: 2
Last visit: 21.04.2021 - 01:00

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to examine whether conceptual relativism is a prerequisite for conceptual engineering (and if so, then to what extent). In the first part of the paper, I explore and classify varieties of relativism to prepare a distinctive definition of conceptual relativism. In the second part I analyse conceptual relativism and I consequently propose two different readings of conceptual scheme: (i) conceptual scheme as a monolithic, timeless, and determinate systems of meanings, and (ii) conceptual scheme as a system of relatively stable meanings, that is based on agreement and is open to change over time. In the third part of the paper, I show that of those two readings only the second reading of conceptual scheme fits into the practice of conceptual engineering.

Keywords

Analysis, Antirealism, Concepts, Conceptual engineering, Conceptual schemes, Language, Meaning change, Philosophy, Relativism