Based on the description of “pretence,” which according to Bachelard is intrinsic to the very intellectuality of a scientific mind, the paper tries to show Bachelard’s redefinition of the phenomenological concept of intentionality: He does not conceives the latter as an intentionality of fulfillment, but rather as an intentionality of emptying. Since the objects of contemporary science have been defying perception, the intention has continuously to question and correct itself, i.e. give up fulfillment. This intentionality of emptying should show how the kenosis of the subject in science can be reconsidered: A scientist has to empty himself/herself, get rid of his/her own psychological life and become an object for himself/herself to make the objective knowledge possible. The exponential psychology of pretence reveals the paradoxical fact that this subject devoid of himself/herself is still present in himself/herself.