The aim of the article is to investigate the issue of freedom as a political value, its relationship to the so-called reflexive freedom and its two historical forms: freedom as autonomy and freedom as authenticity. The introduction examines the problem of whether freedom belongs more to the domain of metaphysics or political philosophy, and discusses the ideas of existentialist understanding of freedom. The idea of negative liberty as the core of the liberal conception of justice is critically examined against the background of a summary of Honneth’s ideas on reflexive, negative, and social freedom and its historical protagonists. The author emphasizes the weaknesses and the inability of the liberal concept of freedom and justice to solve mainly the problem of people with disabilities, global justice and issues related to species specificity.
Arendt, Authenticity, Berlin, Camus, Freedom – Liberties – Negativ liberty – Liberal justice, Honneth, Individual autonomy, Reflexive freedom, Sartre, Social freedom, Williams