@article {1048,
	title = {Textualizmus a pr{\'a}vny pozitivizmus z h{\v l}adiska filozofie jazyka},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {19},
	number = {1},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {145-162},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {This paper addresses the problem which consists in the cases when the court properly makes substantive evaluative judgments in coming to a decision that determines what the law is. Since legal positivism says that one can determine what the law is without making any such judgments, there may seem to be a conflict here. The discussion of legal positivism throws light on contemporary disputes about the doctrine of interpretation known as {\textquotedblleft}textualism.{\textquotedblright} S. Soames (textualism<sub>2</sub>) states that the content of a legal text is what the lawmakers say, assert, or stipulate in adopting the text. A. Scalia (textualism<sub>1</sub>) argues that the content of a legal text is the meaning {\textendash} sometimes {\textquotedblleft}the ordinary meaning{\textquotedblright} {\textendash} of the text. The paper shows that legal positivism is consistent with the second definition of textualism.},
	keywords = {A. Scalia., easy case, hard case, legal positivism, ordinary meaning, philosophy of language, philosophy of law, S. Soames, textualism},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/prilohy/2012/1/145-162.pdf},
	author = {Ne{\v s}tina, Marek}
}
