@article {strawson_g2009:1899,
	title = {Against {\textquoteleft}Corporism{\textquoteright}: The Two Uses of {\textquoteleft}I{\textquoteright}},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {16},
	number = {4},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {428-448},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {In his book Individuals P. F. Strawson writes that {\textquoteleft}both the Cartesian and the no-ownership theorists are profoundly wrong in holding, as each must, that there are two uses of {\textquoteleft}I{\textquoteright}, in one of which it denotes something which it does not denote in the other{\textquoteright} (p. 98). I think, by contrast, that there is a defensible {\textquoteleft}Cartesian materialist{\textquoteright} sense, which Strawson need not reject, in which I (=df. the word {\textquoteleft}I{\textquoteright} or the concept i) can and does denote two different things, and which is nothing like the flawed Wittgensteinian distinction between the use of I {\textquoteleft}as object{\textquoteright} and the use of I {\textquoteleft}as subject{\textquoteright}. I don{\textquoteright}t argue directly for the {\textquoteleft}two uses{\textquoteright} view, however. Instead I do some preparatory work. First I criticize one bad (Wittgensteinian or {\textquoteleft}Wittgensteinian{\textquoteright}) argument for the {\textquoteleft}only one use of I{\textquoteright} view. Then I offer a phenomenological description of our everyday experience of ourselves that leads to an attack on {\textquoteleft}corporism{\textquoteright}{\textemdash}the excessive focus on the body in present-day analytic philosophy of mind.},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2009/4/428-448.pdf},
	author = {Strawson, Galen}
}
