@article {kunes_j2009:1904,
	title = {Strawson and Kant on Being {\textquoteleft}I{\textquoteright}},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {16},
	number = {4},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {493-509},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {Strawson developed his descriptive metaphysics in close relation to Kant{\textquoteright}s metaphysics of experience which can be understood as a particular version of descriptive metaphysics. At the same time, Strawson rejects the foundations of Kant{\textquoteright}s version of descriptive metaphysics which, according to him, is a species of psychology. His argument against Kant{\textquoteright}s conception of subject, or of the {\textquoteleft}I{\textquoteright}, can be found in his conception of person. A closer scrutiny of this conception of Strawson can, however, reveal that it is not comprehensive enough compared with that of Kant. Speaking with Kant, Strawson understands the part of being {\textquoteleft}I{\textquoteright} which can be known via self-knowledge but he fails to appreciate the second part of being {\textquoteleft}I{\textquoteright}, namely self-consciousness. A comparison of Strawson{\textquoteright}s conception with Kant{\textquoteright}s conception of being {\textquoteleft}I{\textquoteright} reveals its systematic shortcomings that rather support, against Strawson{\textquoteright}s purpose, Kant{\textquoteright}s version of descriptive metaphysics as a theory of subjectivity.},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2009/4/493-509.pdf},
	author = {Kune{\v s}, Jan}
}
