@article {goswick_d2010:2094,
	title = {Lewisian-Style Counterfactual Analysis of Causation: A New Solution to the Overdetermination Problem},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {17},
	number = {4},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {461-476},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {Causal overdetermination {\textendash} i.e. instances in which x, y, and z all occur and intuitively the occurrence of x alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z and the occurrence of y alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z {\textendash} has long been considered a problem for counterfactual analyses of causation. Intuitively, we want to say both x and y caused z, but standard Lewisian counterfactual analysis yields the result that neither x nor y caused z. David Lewis, himself, suggested that overdetermination ought to be left as {\textquotedblleft}spoils to the victor{\textquotedblright}. I show how, if we modify Lewis{\textquoteright} account of events slightly, we can bring counterfactual analysis in line with our intuitions about overdetermination.},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2010/4/461-476.pdf},
	author = {Goswick, Dana}
}
