<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Koblížek, Tomáš</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How to Make the Concepts Clear: Searle’s Discussion 	with Derrida</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How to Make the Concepts Clear: Searle’s Discussion with Derrida</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">background</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">concept</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">linguistic meaning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">speaker’s meaning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">utterance</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/prilohy/2012/2/161-169.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">161-169</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The first part of the paper deals with the key question of the Searle-Derrida debate, namely, with the question of conceptual “exactness” and applicability of concepts to facts. I argue that Derrida makes a strict distinction between the exactness in the realm of concepts and the exactness in the realm of facts. Supposing that it is not correct to argue against him – as Searle does – that concepts cannot be exact because there are no strict boundaries between facts. The second part of the paper deals with a distinction used by John Searle: The distinction between linguistic meaning and speaker’s meaning. According to Searle linguistic meaning is constituted outside a particular context of use whereas speaker’s meaning is embedded in a particular situation. I argue this distinction is problematic as far as any meaning is constituted in a particular utterance and in a particular context of use.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Papers</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">161169</style></custom3><custom5><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></custom5></record></records></xml>