<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hatipoğlu, Sinem Elkatip</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Consciousness and Peripheral Self-Awareness</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Consciousness and Peripheral Self-Awareness</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">consciousness</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">higher-order theories of consciousness</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">peripheral self-awareness</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">self-consciousness</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2013/3/323-340.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">323-340</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">English</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">It has been argued that consciousness is not possible without peripheral self-consciousness; i.e., without an implicit awareness of oneself as the subject of one’s mental state. My purpose is to undermine this view. I contend that a subject’s first-personal access to her conscious mental states and an awareness of them as hers, along with a particular approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things motivate the view that consciousness is not possible without self-consciousness. In order to undermine this view I argue that not all conscious states are accompanied by a sense of &lt;i&gt;mineness&lt;/i&gt;. I also reject the reasons for endorsing an approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things. Then I critically examine Kriegel’s arguments for the dependence of consciousness on self-consciousness based on the first-personal access a subject has to her conscious mental states and discuss the difficulties involved.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articles</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">323340</style></custom3></record></records></xml>