<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Zouhar, Marián</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Epistemický kontextualizmus a jeho motivácia</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Epistemic Contextualism and Its Motivation</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Context of utterance vs. circumstances of evaluation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">epistemic contextualism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">epistemic standards</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Keith DeRose</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">variable truth conditions (propositions) vs. stable truth conditions (propositions)</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/prilohy/2013/2/171-186.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">171-186</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Slovak</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">According to Keith DeRose, the best argument for epistemic contextualism is supplied by communication intuitions ordinary speakers have when evaluating utterances of sentences of the form “S knows that p” and “S does not know that p”. It is claimed that utterances of “S knows that p” and “S does not know that p” can both be true with respect to the same S and p because the speakers of the utterances employ different epistemic standards. The aim of the paper is to show that one can accept this claim as true while denying epistemic contextualism. A handful of possible contenders to epistemic contextualism are given. Thus, the alleged best argument for contextualism has to be supplemented by other arguments to show that epistemic contextualism should be given preference to the other approaches.</style></abstract><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">171186</style></custom3><custom5><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></custom5></record></records></xml>