<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Zouhar, Marián</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Puzzle about Rigid Designation</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Puzzle about Rigid Designation</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Intension</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">linguistic convention</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">possible world</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">proper name</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">rigid designation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">rigidity de jure</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/prilohy/2015/1/96-117.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">96-117</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">English</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Proper names are usually supposed to be rigid &lt;i&gt;de jure&lt;/i&gt;. Given this claim and some other usual assumptions—namely that properties are explicated as intensions of a sort and that various possible worlds have various universes—one may derive the following inconsistent pair of conclusions: (i) for all properties &lt;i&gt;P&lt;/i&gt; and for all possible worlds &lt;i&gt;w&lt;/i&gt; it holds that an object, &lt;i&gt;o&lt;/i&gt;, exemplifies &lt;i&gt;P&lt;/i&gt; with respect to &lt;i&gt;w&lt;/i&gt; only if &lt;i&gt;o&lt;/i&gt; exists in &lt;i&gt;w&lt;/i&gt;; and (ii) there is at least one property &lt;i&gt;P&lt;/i&gt; and at least one possible world &lt;i&gt;w&lt;/i&gt; such that &lt;i&gt;o&lt;/i&gt; exemplifies &lt;i&gt;P&lt;/i&gt; with respect to &lt;i&gt;w&lt;/i&gt; even though &lt;i&gt;o&lt;/i&gt; fails to exist in &lt;i&gt;w&lt;/i&gt;. The aim of the present paper is to show how the problematic pair of conclusions is derived, spell out its background (most notably the idea of rigidity &lt;i&gt;de jure&lt;/i&gt;) and review possible ways out.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articles</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">96117</style></custom3><custom5><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></custom5></record></records></xml>