<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Zouhar, Marián</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frege o význame</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Frege on Meaning</style></translated-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1997</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/1997/1/15-38.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15-38</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Though Fregeś second semantical theory is worked out excellently, he did not precisely and explicitly answer the question, which of the two semantical notions he used in his semantics - sense and reference -, could be taken as proper explication of an intuitive notion of meaning. Intuitively, meaning of a word can be connected with an understanding of the word: if we understand the word, we know its meaning. Our problem seems to be accute in connection with present tendency to render words &quot;meaning&quot; and &quot;význam&quot; as proper translations of German word &quot;Bedeutung&quot;, used by Frege to refer to named or signed objects (i. e. wordś referent or denotation). Fregeś basic concepts of both periods of developing of his thinking - Inhalt, Sinn and Bedeutung -, having been outlined, the author tries to explicate this intuitive notion of meaning as wordś content, or wordś sense and reference, respectively. This attempt is aimed to give a possible Fregeś answer to the above question. Then the discussion about a few counter-arguments follows and its main profit is in illumination of some less clear aspects of our interpretation of Fregeś conceptual apparatus. In the end the author argues that the word &quot;meaning&quot; as translation of &quot;Bedeutung&quot; does not cohere with Fregeś possible intentions, and defends the words like e. g. &quot;denotation&quot; as much better and clearer translations than the above one.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Papers</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1538</style></custom3></record></records></xml>