<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Riška, Augustín</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Logical-Pragmatic Theory of Objects</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Logical-Pragmatic Theory of Objects</style></translated-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2006</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2006/3/306-320.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">13</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">306-320</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">There are two fundamental questions concerning the choice and presence of objects in various formal systems: (1) Where do these objects come from? (2) What do (can) we know about them? To answer these questions I introduce the notion of a proto-ontology as the pre-theoretic realm of (unspecified) entities from which the basic objects – individuals – of the formal system S are postulated. The pragmatic aspects of such choices are investigated with regard to first-order logic, both pure and applied, set theory and mereology. It is claimed that the postulated (chosen, constructed) objects enter the formal system S with a package of properties and relationships, the recognition of which depends on the interpretation and application of the available predicates of S. If these properties and relationships are not made explicit, a possible clash may arise between them and the properties and relationships “assigned” to the individuals of S by the interpreted predicates of S. As regards the relationship between logic and metaphysics, I contend that logic can perhaps be viewed as the articulation of the fundamental features of proto-ontological objects without which no discourse or theory would be possible. In this sense logic could also be viewed as a theory and method of the construction of a well-articulated metaphysical theory.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Papers</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">306320</style></custom3></record></records></xml>