@article {1167,
title = {Rational Akrasia},
journal = {Organon F},
volume = {20},
number = {4},
year = {2013},
pages = {546-566},
type = {State},
abstract = {It is commonly thought that one is irrationally akratic when one believes one ought to F but does not intend to F. However, some philosophers, following Robert Audi, have argued that it is sometimes rational to have this combination of attitudes. I here consider the question of whether rational akrasia is possible. I argue that those arguments for the possibility of rational akrasia advanced by Audi and others do not succeed. Specifically, I argue that cases in which an akratic agent acts as he has most reason to act, and cases in which an akratic agent achieves a kind of global coherence he wouldn{\textquoteright}t have achieved had he instead formed intentions in line with his best judgment, do not establish the possibility of rational akrasia. However, I do think that rational akrasia is possible, and I present two arguments for this thesis. The first argument involves a case in which one is incapable of revising one{\textquoteright}s belief about what one ought to do, where one also acknowledges this belief to be insufficiently supported by the evidence. The second argument involves a case in which one rationally believes that one ought to have an akratic combination of attitudes.},
keywords = {Akrasia, Audi, Broome, enkrateia, Enkratic Requirement, rational requirements, rationality},
url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2013/4/546-566.pdf},
author = {Brunero, John}
}