%0 Journal Article %J Organon F %D 2013 %T Against Normative Judgement Internalism %A Miranda del Corral %K Akrasia %K Enkrasia %K normative requirements %K norrmative judgements %K practical reasoning %X Normative judgement internalism claims that enkrasia is an ideal of rational agency that poses a necessary link between making a normative judgement, and forming an intention to act according to that judgement. Against this view, I argue that enkrasia does not require the formation of new intentional states; instead, it requires that the agent’s intentions do not contravene her normative judgements. The main argument for considering that an intention ought to follow from a normative judgement is the claim that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention. I will argue that this account is mistaken: practical reasoning aims at justifying certain actions or intentions, and thus its conclusion is a normative judgement. Defenders of NJI might argue, though, that intentions ought to follow from our normative judgements, because of certain requirements affecting not only practical reasoning, but rational agency. I argue that this conception of enkrasia is too demanding. Enkrasia, I suggest, is better understood as a restriction over our intentions: they ought not enter into conflict with our judgements. %B Organon F %V 20 %P 567-587 %G English %U http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2013/4/567-587.pdf %9 State %2 Articles %3 567587