@article {pagin_p2001:94,
	title = {Frege on Truth and Judgement},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {8},
	number = {1},
	year = {2001},
	pages = {1-13},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {In {\'O}n sense and reference\' Frege by way of example states the redundancy theory of truth: the thought expressed by \'5 is a prime number\' is the same as that expressed by \'The thought, that 5 is a prime number, is true\'. In the very same paragraph, Frege also states the weaker thesis that by saying of a thought that it is true, one just produces a thought. One doesn\'t manage to advance from a thought to a truth value. Therefore, one doesn\'t make a *judgment*, since judging that 5 is a prime number consists in advancing from the thought to a truth value. Frege uses this observation to argue that truth cannot be a *property* of thoughts. In this paper two tasks are attempted. First, reconstructing Frege{\'s} reasoning as a regress argument, and secondly, evaluating this argument.},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2001/1/1-13.pdf},
	author = {Pagin, Peter}
}
