@article {1071,
	title = {Searle on Analyticity, Necessity and Proper Names},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {19},
	number = {2},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {109-136},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {My aim is to show that once we appreciate how Searle (1958) fills in the details of his account of proper names {\textendash} which I will dub the presuppositional view {\textendash} and how we might supplement it further, we are in for a twofold discovery. First, Searle{\textquoteright}s account is crucially unlike the so-called cluster-of-descriptions view, which many philosophers take Searle to have held. Second, the presuppositional view he did hold is interesting, plausible, and worthy of serious reconsideration. The idea that Searle{\textquoteright}s account is a largely Fregean interlude between the Fregean description theory of proper names and Kripke{\textquoteright}s proposals presented in {\textquotedblleft}Naming and necessity{\textquotedblright} is in major ways a myth, a mythical chapter in how the story of 20th-century philosophy of language is often told.},
	keywords = {definite descriptions, meaning, presuppositions, proper names, reference},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/prilohy/2012/2/109-136.pdf},
	author = {Zvolenszky, Zs{\'o}fia}
}
