@article {1117,
	title = {Consciousness and Peripheral Self-Awareness},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {20},
	number = {3},
	year = {2013},
	pages = {323-340},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {It has been argued that consciousness is not possible without peripheral self-consciousness; i.e., without an implicit awareness of oneself as the subject of one{\textquoteright}s mental state. My purpose is to undermine this view. I contend that a subject{\textquoteright}s first-personal access to her conscious mental states and an awareness of them as hers, along with a particular approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things motivate the view that consciousness is not possible without self-consciousness. In order to undermine this view I argue that not all conscious states are accompanied by a sense of <i>mineness</i>. I also reject the reasons for endorsing an approach to consciousness according to which a subject cannot be unconsciously conscious of things. Then I critically examine Kriegel{\textquoteright}s arguments for the dependence of consciousness on self-consciousness based on the first-personal access a subject has to her conscious mental states and discuss the difficulties involved.},
	keywords = {consciousness, higher-order theories of consciousness, peripheral self-awareness, self-consciousness},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2013/3/323-340.pdf},
	author = {Hatipo{\u g}lu, Sinem Elkatip}
}
