@article {1118,
	title = {Infallibility about the Self },
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {20},
	number = {3},
	year = {2013},
	pages = {341-354},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {On a common formulation, rationalist infallibilism is committed to two main theses: (i) {\textquoteleft}analytic a priori infallibilism{\textquoteright} and (ii) {\textquoteleft}synthetic a priori infallibilism{\textquoteright}. According to thesis (i), a relatively wide range of analytic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified. According to thesis (ii), a relatively wide range of synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified. In this paper, I focus on rationalist infallibilism{\textquoteright}s second main thesis, what is being called {\textquoteleft}synthetic a priori infallibilism{\textquoteright}. I argue that synthetic a priori infallibilism, and by extension rationalist infallibilism, is untenable. In particular, exploring what seems to be the only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I reject the infallible justification of propositions about the self.},
	keywords = {Cogito, dubito, infallibility, privileged access, rationalism, self-knowledge},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2013/3/341-354.pdf},
	author = {Hoffmann, Glen}
}
