@article {1149,
	title = {Prečo len (nutné) pravdy ako predpoklady deduktívnych úsudkov?},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {20},
	number = {2},
	year = {2013},
	pages = {75-97},
	abstract = {The aim of the paper is to examine Tichý{\textquoteright}s understanding of the term {\textquotedblleft}assumption{\textquotedblright}. We show that Tichý distinguishes two approaches to inference: the one-dimensional view that treats inferences as a sequences of logical rules or axioms as well as hypotheses and their logical consequences; and the two-dimensional view specifying inference as a derivation of one entailment from (the set of) another entailment(s). It is claimed that Tichý is right in his critique of Meinong{\textquoteright}s concept of assumption as {\textquoteleft}assertion without conviction{\textquoteright}. Nevertheless, Tichý {\textendash} in addition to his <i>logical concept</i> of assumption {\textendash} uses, though unreflectively, also the <i>epistemic concept</i> of assumption. Henceforth, we claim that accepting Tichý{\textquoteright}s rejection of the epistemically hypothetical assumptions we couldn{\textquoteright}t use logic as an instrument for empirical knowledge enhancement. We believe, to the contrary, that the epistemic assumptions may become a basis for derivations and knowledge enhancement, even though they do not represent necessary truths.},
	keywords = {Assumption, empirical truth, epistemical, hypotethical, inference, necessary truth},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/prilohy/2013/2/75-97.pdf},
	author = {Gah{\'e}r, Franti{\v s}ek and Bielik, Luk{\'a}{\v s}}
}
