@article {1237,
	title = {Heidegger{\textquoteright}s Logico-Semantic Strikeback},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {22},
	number = {1},
	year = {2015},
	pages = {19-38},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {In (1959), Carnap famously attacked Heidegger for having constructed an insane metaphysics based on a misconception of both the logical form and the semantics of ordinary language. In what follows, it will be argued that, once one appropriately (i.e., in a Russellian fashion) reads Heidegger{\textquoteright}s famous sentence that should paradigmatically exemplify such a misconception, i.e., {\textquotedblleft}the nothing nothings{\textquotedblright}, there is nothing either logically or semantically wrong with it. The real controversy as to how that sentence has to be evaluated{\textemdash}not as to its meaning but as to its truth{\textemdash}lies at the metaphysico-ontological level. For in order for the sentence to be true one has to endorse an ontology of impossibilia and Leibniz{\textquoteright}s principle of the identity of indiscernibles.},
	keywords = {Impossibilia, logical form, metaphysics, nothing, ontology, possibilia, theory of descriptions},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/prilohy/2015/1/19-38.pdf},
	author = {Voltolini, Alberto}
}
