@article {cana_t2006:1330,
	title = {{\quotedblbase}Gramatick{\'e} pravidlo{\textquotedblleft} u neskor{\'e}ho Wittgensteina},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {13},
	number = {3},
	year = {2006},
	pages = {349-360},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {The paper deals with Ludwig Wittgenstein{\textquoteright}s approach to {\quotedblbase}rule following activities{\textquotedblleft}. Wittgenstein made many profound remarks, especially on the nature of the rules determining our communication in everyday language. Some of these remarks are in the centre of a current philosophical controversy known as rule following considerations. Among many contributors the most important one is probably Saul Kripke. The aim of this paper is to refute Kripke{\textquoteright}s interpretation of Wittgenstein{\textquoteright}s approach to these activities, which Kripke developes in his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. According to Kripke, the central argument of Philosophische Untersuchungen {\textendash} the private language argument {\textendash} leads us to so-called sceptical conclusion. From this conclusion it follows that in everyday language there is no clear meaning of the term {\quotedblbase}following a rule{\textquotedblleft}. The paper is an attempt to reconsider this approach and to demonstrate that this sceptical interpretation of the private language argument is misleading.},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2006/3/349-360.pdf},
	author = {{\v C}ana, Tom{\'a}{\v s}}
}
