@article {yang_s2009:1770,
	title = {Emotion, Intentionality and Appropriateness of Emotion},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {16},
	number = {1},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {82-104},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {In explaining emotion, there are strong cognitive views, which reduce emotion to belief/thought or judgment. Misgivings about assimilating emotion to belief/thought/judgment have been a main reason for moving towards perceptual accounts for many authors. My aim in this paper is to defend a perceptual theory. To this end, I first argue against a crude version of cognitivism that views emotion essentially in terms of thought or belief. I then argue that doubts about the assimilation of emotion to belief explain the appeal of {\textquoteleft}perception{\textquoteright} as the {\textquoteleft}cognitive element{\textquoteright} most appropriate to the analysis of emotion. Then I shall discuss why perception is the right category to fit emotional responses into by contrasting some considerations adduced by Sabine D{\"o}ring and by Jesse Prinz. I shall show that Prinz ignores the perspective aspect of perception, while D{\"o}ring fails to explain the indiscriminability in perceptual experience. For these reasons, both Prinz{\textquoteright}s and D{\"o}ring{\textquoteright}s views are insufficient to explain emotional recalcitrance or unmerited emotional response. To explain emotional recalcitrance, I argue that we must appeal to a disjunctivist theory of visual experience. I shall demonstrate why we should prefer the explanation in terms of indiscriminability over one which appeals to a common element, such as a thought or representation of something as dangerous, for example. The present critical examination will afford an alternative view of the appropriateness of emotions.},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2009/1/82-104.pdf},
	author = {Yang, Sunny}
}
