@article {yang_s2009:1853,
	title = {Goldie{\textquoteright}s Puzzling Two Feelings: {\textquoteleft}Bodily Feeling{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}Feeling Toward{\textquoteright}},
	journal = {Organon F},
	volume = {16},
	number = {3},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {317-327},
	type = {State},
	abstract = {Emotion theorists in contemporary discussion have divided into two camps. The one claims that emotions are reducible to bodily feelings; the other holds that emotions are reducible to belief, desire or evaluative judgement. In an effort to avoid such reductionist view, Goldie suggests that emotions involve two kinds of feelings: bodily feel-ings and feeling towards. In spite of Goldie{\textquoteright}s efforts, I argue that ex-plaining our emotional disposition in terms of {\textquoteleft}feeling toward{\textquoteright} re-mains distinctly unsatisfactory. Furthermore, though sympathetic to his project, I give reasons for doubting that there are two such distinct kinds of feeling, one of which has only borrowed intentionality, while the other has intentionality intrinsically.},
	url = {http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2009/3/317-327.pdf},
	author = {Yang, Sunny}
}
