<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Havlík, Vladimír</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Metametodologie a naturalismus</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Metamethodology and Naturalism</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">metamethodology</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">methodological rules</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">naturalism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">philosophy of science</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/prilohy/2012/1/56-77.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">56-77</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The article deals with the problem of consistency between metamethodology and naturalism in the philosophy of science. In the first part I clarify the concept of metamethodology in light of Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programs and his four theories of rationality. In the second part I analyze the naturalization of epistemology in Quine’s perspective and the question whether metamethodology is compatible with his non-normative sort of naturalism. The final part focuses on the Laudan’s version of naturalism which tries to retain normativity. I analyze Laudan’s program for justification and appraisal of methodological rules and his attempt to formulate a metamethodological rule, which would be acceptable for all concurrent methodologies. From the naturalistic point of view it seems unacceptable that the naturalistic program would admit inviolable rule. I find such an objection to the metamethodological rule mistaken, but I formulate another objection as to why Laudan’s rule is unacceptable. I propose my own version of metamethodological rules, which are inviolable but methodologically empty and trivial, and I try to show that the existence of such 	rules represent a worry for normative naturalism, but not a fatal flaw.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Papers</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5677</style></custom3><custom5><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></custom5></record></records></xml>