<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Neština, Marek</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Textualizmus a právny pozitivizmus z hľadiska filozofie jazyka</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Textualism and Legal Positivism in the Philosophy of Language</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A. Scalia.</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">easy case</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hard case</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">legal positivism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ordinary meaning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">philosophy of language</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">philosophy of law</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">S. Soames</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">textualism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/prilohy/2012/1/145-162.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">145-162</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This paper addresses the problem which consists in the cases when the court properly makes substantive evaluative judgments in coming to a decision that determines what the law is. Since legal positivism says that one can determine what the law is without making any such judgments, there may seem to be a conflict here. The discussion of legal positivism throws light on contemporary disputes about the doctrine of interpretation known as “textualism.” S. Soames (textualism&lt;sub&gt;2&lt;/sub&gt;) states that the content of a legal text is what the lawmakers say, assert, or stipulate in adopting the text. A. Scalia (textualism&lt;sub&gt;1&lt;/sub&gt;) argues that the content of a legal text is the meaning – sometimes “the ordinary meaning” – of the text. The paper shows that legal positivism is consistent with the second definition of textualism.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Papers</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">145162</style></custom3><custom5><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></custom5></record></records></xml>