<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Zámečník, Lukáš</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">External Realism as a Non-Epistemic Thesis</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">External Realism as a Non-Epistemic Thesis</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">condition of intelligibility</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">constructive empiricism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">external realism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">naturalism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">point-of-view invariance</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/prilohy/2012/2/25-30.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25-30</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In this paper I concentrate on evaluating Searle’s concept of external realism as a non-epistemic thesis . Above all, I evaluate the role it plays in our system of beliefs, knowledge and communicative obligations. There are two important questions: (1) whether a return of transcendental philosophy creates a positive alternative to philosophical naturalism (Quine); (2) whether for the same purpose Fraassens’ constructive empiricism suffices. </style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Papers</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2530</style></custom3><custom5><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></custom5></record></records></xml>