<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Havlík, Vladimír</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Searle on Emergence</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Searle on Emergence</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">consciousness</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">emergence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">emergent property</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mind</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">system property</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/prilohy/2012/2/40-48.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">40-48</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Searle’s conception of ontological emergence is a basis for his explanation of mind and consciousness in the physical world. In this article, I try to show that a closer examination uncovers some possible ambiguities in Searle’s conception of emergence. First, I try to show that Searle’s distinction between emergent1 and emergent2 leads to a distinction between a strong and a weak interpretation of a causal consequence of interactions among constitutive entities and that from this point of view the existence of emergent2 is improbable only in the strong sense. Second, I attempt to clarify Searle’s distinction between &lt;i&gt;explanation&lt;/i&gt; and &lt;i&gt;deduction&lt;/i&gt; of consciousness in his claim for the non-deducibility of consciousness . At the end I try to show in what sense is Searle’s concept of emergence loaded with a form of mechanicism, one which is being abandoned in more recent ontological conceptions.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Papers</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4048</style></custom3><custom5><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></custom5></record></records></xml>