<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hoffmann, Glen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Infallibility about the Self </style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Infallibility about the Self</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cogito</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">dubito</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">infallibility</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">privileged access</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">rationalism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">self-knowledge</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2013</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2013/3/341-354.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">341-354</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">English</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On a common formulation, rationalist infallibilism is committed to two main theses: (i) ‘analytic a priori infallibilism’ and (ii) ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. According to thesis (i), a relatively wide range of analytic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified. According to thesis (ii), a relatively wide range of synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified. In this paper, I focus on rationalist infallibilism’s second main thesis, what is being called ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. I argue that synthetic a priori infallibilism, and by extension rationalist infallibilism, is untenable. In particular, exploring what seems to be the only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I reject the infallible justification of propositions about the self.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articles</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">341354</style></custom3></record></records></xml>