<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Prelević, Duško</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modal Empiricism and Knowledge of De Re Possibilities: A Critique of Roca-Royes’ Account</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Modal Empiricism and Knowledge of De Re Possibilities: A Critique of Roca-Royes’ Account</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">De re modal knowledge</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">modal empiricism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">modal epistemology</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">modal rationalism</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2015/4/488-498.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">488-498</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">English</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Accounting for our knowledge of &lt;em&gt;de re&lt;/em&gt; modalities is probably the main reason why the proponents of modal empiricism think that their view should be preferred to modal rationalism. In this paper, I address Sonia Roca-Royes’ account, which is taken to be a representative modal empiricist view, in order to show that modal empiricism faces serious problems even in explaining our knowledge of possibility &lt;em&gt;de re&lt;/em&gt;, something which seems to be the easiest thing to explain on this view. I argue that Roca-Royes’ account does not prove what she claims it does, that it can hardly be articulated in a non-redundant way, and that her account of our knowledge of possibility &lt;em&gt;de re&lt;/em&gt; can hardly be reconciled with the essentiality of origin principle, to which modal empiricists sometimes appeal while criticizing the modal rationalist account.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articles</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">488498</style></custom3></record></records></xml>