<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Posłajko, Krzysztof</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Grabarczyk, Paweł</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inferentialism without Normativity</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inferentialism without Normativity</style></translated-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ajdukiewicz</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Brandom</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">inferentialism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">normativity of meaning</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2018</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2018/2/174-195.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">174-195</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">English</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In this paper we argue that inferentialist approach to meaning does not, by itself, show that meaning is normative in a prescriptive sense, and that the constitutive rules argument is especially troubling for this position. To show that, we present the proto-inferentialist theory developed by Ajdukiewicz and claim that despite the differences between his theory and contemporary inferentialism rules of language in both theories function more like classificatory devices than prescriptions. Inferentialists can respond by claiming that in their theory meaning is essentially social and hence normative, but we claim that then semantic normativity becomes derivative of social normativity.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Articles</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">174195</style></custom3></record></records></xml>