<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Schmidt, Martin</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Causation and Structural Realism</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Organon F</style></secondary-title><translated-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Causation and Structural Realism</style></translated-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2010</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2010/4/508-521.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></number><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">17</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">508-521</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">M. Esfeld has recently argued that ontic structural realism may succeed only if it is based on causal structures. In order to meet this requirement, he offers a combination of dispositional/causal relations with moderate form of ontic structural realism. This paper, however, demonstrates that moderate position, in relation to causation, faces a dilemma whose resolution leads to a monistic ontology that creates a rather hostile environment for structural metaphysics.</style></abstract><work-type><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">State</style></work-type><custom2><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Papers</style></custom2><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">508521</style></custom3></record></records></xml>