TY - JOUR T1 - The Distinctive Rationality of Intentions JF - Organon F Y1 - 2013 A1 - Botting, David KW - Broome KW - cognitivism KW - krasia KW - practical rationality AB - In this paper I intend to defend Broome’s cognitivist view that reduces practical normativity to theoretical normativity, but argue that this leaves unaccounted for distinctively practical norms that I seek to capture as a system of local obligations to have particular intentions. The krasia requirement dictates what obligations we have relative to the normative beliefs that we have but does not tell us what intentions it is rational to have all-things-considered. IS - 4 VL - 20 SP - 507-526 UR - http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2013/4/507-526.pdf U2 - Articles U3 - 507526 TI - The Distinctive Rationality of Intentions ER -