TY - JOUR T1 - Goldie’s Puzzling Two Feelings: ‘Bodily Feeling’ and ‘Feeling Toward’ JF - Organon F Y1 - 2009 A1 - Yang, Sunny AB - Emotion theorists in contemporary discussion have divided into two camps. The one claims that emotions are reducible to bodily feelings; the other holds that emotions are reducible to belief, desire or evaluative judgement. In an effort to avoid such reductionist view, Goldie suggests that emotions involve two kinds of feelings: bodily feel­ings and feeling towards. In spite of Goldie’s efforts, I argue that ex­plaining our emotional disposition in terms of ‘feeling toward’ re­mains distinctly unsatisfactory. Furthermore, though sympathetic to his project, I give reasons for doubting that there are two such distinct kinds of feeling, one of which has only borrowed intentionality, while the other has intentionality intrinsically. IS - 3 VL - 16 SP - 317-327 UR - http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/organon/2009/3/317-327.pdf U2 - Papers U3 - 317327 TI - Goldie’s Puzzling Two Feelings: ‘Bodily Feeling’ and ‘Feeling Toward’ ER -