Article/Publication Details

The Bootstrapping Objection

(Original title: The Bootstrapping Objection)
Organon F, 2013, vol. 20, No 4, pp. 612-631.
Language: English
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If our mental attitudes were reasons, we could bootstrap anything into rationality simply by acquiring these mental attitudes. This, it has been argued, shows that mental attitudes cannot be reasons. In this paper, I focus on John Broome’s development of the bootstrapping objection. I distinguish various versions of this objection and I argue that the bootstrapping objection to mind-based accounts of reasons fails in all its versions.


Bratman, Broome, intention, reasoning, reasons

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