Article/Publication Details

External Realism as a Non-Epistemic Thesis

(Original title: External Realism as a Non-Epistemic Thesis)
Organon F, 2012, vol. 19, Supplementary Issue 2, pp. 25-30.
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Abstract

In this paper I concentrate on evaluating Searle’s concept of external realism as a non-epistemic thesis . Above all, I evaluate the role it plays in our system of beliefs, knowledge and communicative obligations. There are two important questions: (1) whether a return of transcendental philosophy creates a positive alternative to philosophical naturalism (Quine); (2) whether for the same purpose Fraassens’ constructive empiricism suffices.

Keywords

condition of intelligibility, constructive empiricism, external realism, naturalism, point-of-view invariance

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