This is the first part of the essay devoted to the story of logicism, in particular to its Fregean version. Reviewing the classical period of Fregean studies, we first point out some critical moments of Frege‘s argumentation in the Grundlagen, in order to be able later to differentiate between its salvageable and defective features. We work on the presumption that there are no easy, categorical answers to questions like “Is logicism dead?“: Wittgenstein’s critique of the foundational program as well as the remarkable neo-Fregean discoveries of Boolos and Wright have to be confronted with the effects which the logicistic idea actually had on logicomatematical practice. But that is another story, a sequel to this essay, the purpose of which is systematic rather than critical.
*Príspevok je chránený zákonom o autorskom práve a právach súvisiacich s autorským právom (autorský zákon).