In the paper, I question some of the claims professor Searle makes about external realism, a position I accept. I briefly sum up Searle’s position, and then proceed to the mentioned critique. In particular, the target of my paper is Searle’s claim that external realist is to shun commitment to any particular ontology. I also point out that Searle’s external realism is in some respects difficult to disentangle from ontological constructivism, a position incompatible with external realism. The paper concludes with an apology for the idea of a “Privileged Conceptual Scheme” that Searle views as misguided.
conceptual relativity, constructivism, external realism, John Searle, Privilege Conceptual Scheme
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