Article/Publication Details

Finding as a Notional Attitude (II)

(Original title: Nalézáni jako pojmový postoj (I))
Organon F, 2005, vol. 12, No 2, pp. 141-167.
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Abstract

Although finding does not seem to be logically and philosophically so much interesting as (intentional attitude of ) seeking, the present study gives exhaustive survey of logical analyses corresponding to (surprisingly many) kinds of finding (altogether with related issues). There are four basic groups of findings (all of them are expressed in natural languages in homonymous way): I) finding by accidence, II) finding after seeking which is typically relation between an agent and an intension, III) finding after finding an instance of intension to which was an agent related by seeking, IV) finding pejorativelly reported (agent is not really finding respective thing). Only type II) can be considered as a notional attitude because it is a relation to an intension (a suitable candidate for ‘notion’); moreover, this relation is unique in the sense that agent is related just and only to one exact intension (thus its concept cannot be substituted by concept expressed by expression which is not coreferential in all possible worlds and time moments with the expression denoting original intension).

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