The paper is based on transparent intensional logic. A sentence denotes a proposition (i.e., a function associating possible worlds and time points with truth-values) and expresses a construction in the sense of Tichý´s definition (reproduced in the paper). ‘Belief sentences’ refer to an attitude of some individual to the sense of the dependent clause, i.e., to the respective construction, which eliminates such problems as ‘paradox of omniscience’. In the case of empirical dependent clauses we can observe that at least besides this relation to a construction one can define a relation of the subject to the state-of-affairs, represented by a proposition, i.e., by the denotation of the sentence. To stipulate such a kind of attitudes is justified by such cases where X says that (s)he believes that Chicago is smaller than Prague and Y refers to this X’s belief saying that X believes that Prague is larger than Chicago.