Detail príspevku/publikácie

A Few Comments on the Linda Problem

Organon F, 2017, roč. 24, č. 2, s. 184-195.
Jazyk: English
Súbor na stiahnutie: PDF*

Štatistika dokumentu:

Počet prístupov: 539
Počet prístupov dnes: 1
Naposledy zobrazené: 17.11.2017 - 19:55
Počet stiahnutí PDF: 122

Abstrakt

This paper discusses an experiment in cognitive psychology called the Linda problem. Firstly, some natural conditions for the correctness of the interpretation of psychological experiments (such as the Linda problem) are formulated. The article is essentially a critique of the interpretation of the results of the Linda problem experiment provided by Kahneman and Tversky as well as – indirectly – their concept of heuristics. It is shown that the interpretation provided by Kahneman and Tversky does not meet the aforementioned conditions for correctness. The main argument is justified utilizing such rules of rationality as conditional probability and Grice’s conversational maxims. It is also pointed out that this argument can be reformulated in terms of the intuitive system of reasoning.

Kľúčové slová

cognitive psychology, conditional probability, conjunction fallacy, Linda problem

*Príspevok je chránený zákonom o autorskom práve a právach súvisiacich s autorským právom (autorský zákon).