The analysis of responsibility ascription in the normative domain is an area of research that has long since attracted philosophers interested in morality or law. In recent years it has gained importance within a broader scientific community, due to the emergence of new phenomena that are reshaping many aspects of our lives and posing challenges to our normative conventions. Paradigmatic examples of these phenomena are: the creation of huge data sets for information storage, the widespread use of social networks, and the release of machines able to address various tasks in an autonomous way. To a considerable extent, understanding how responsibility should be ascribed in such contexts is still an open problem and requires additional precision from a methodological point of view. For this reason, philosophical accounts of responsibility have been gradually supported by formal methods. In the present project we contribute to the latter issue by clarifying the theoretical structure of the notion of responsibility with a modular approach. Responsibility is treated as a complex normative notion: first, we identify its main conceptual components; then, we use a logical language to rigorously define these components and their combinations; finally, we rely again on philosophical analysis and, in particular, on notions from moral philosophy, ontology and philosophy of language, in order to assess and refine our formal outputs. We use analytic methods throughout the project. This approach has already led project members to relevant results in the area of normative reasoning. The project is carried on with an interdisciplinary perspective, relying on the connections among the fields of expertise of the various project members.