A key theme in the existentialist movement of both the 19th and the 20th centuries was that of nihilism or meaninglessness. The existentialists argued that there was no intrinsic value in anything and that any truth claim about values was always based on irrational, ideological, or self-deceived argumentation. They were thus reluctant to argue for the value of anything at all. This undermined their attempts to create a theory of ethics, which by its very nature depends on the assumption of values and claims about what is right or wrong. Is it possible to resolve this problem in the existential tradition? There is clearly a strong ethical or even moralizing element in the works of many existentialist authors, such as Kierkegaard and Sartre, but can this be made into a genuine and consistent theory of ethics given the basic principle of nihilism and meaninglessness? Does this dilemma still exist today in the 21st century, which has also been regarded as an age of nihilism?

The goal of the dissertation will be to explore the issues of passivity, attention, and the capacity of recognition based on the phenomenological analysis elaborated by Edmund Husserl (in the relevant texts of Husserliana). The thesis will trace these concepts in analyses of passive syntheses and constitutions, how are they constituted by the pre-reflective givenness of the world that is part of subjectivity. This theme is also presented, for example, by P. Ricœur on the basis of Husserl's elaboration of the concept of the life-world, which figures as a background that modifies subjective acts. This topic has also been addressed by other phenomenologists, such as A. J. Steinbock, D. Zahavi and others. The elaboration of the dissertation presupposes knowledge of phenomenological philosophy and the ability to work with German primary sources.