In this article I describe two paradoxes that arise when we think about exploitation. The first is that though transactions that are mutually beneficial and consensual are often considered permissible, some characteristically exploitative transactions satisfy these conditions. This paradox is not particularly puzzling; indeed to solve the first paradox is simply to offer an account of the unfairness involved in cases of exploitation. However, because different accounts of exploitation offer different resolutions of this paradox, it provides a useful way to categorise and contrast many theories of exploitation. The second paradox is closely related to the first. But unlike the first, its resolution is not straightforward. I show that the standard intuition that in ordinary cases mutually beneficial and consensual transaction are omissible conflicts with the equally plausible non-worseness condition. I show that the most plausible solution to the second paradox can be accepted only by a hybrid moral theory that combines a concern for fairness with a concern for welfare.